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A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case asks the Court to define the boundaries of a county's land use and planning
authority under the Local Land Use and Planning Act, Idaho Code§ 67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA")
in regulating agricultural operations so as to protect water quality when water quality is
comprehensively regulated at dairy and beef cattle operations in Idaho by the state and federal
governments.
This matter is before the Court on appeal of the District Court's sua sponte order granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Respondent Gooding County ("County") and
dismissing Plaintiffs/Appellants Idaho Dairy Association, Inc. and The Idaho Cattle Association,
Inc.'s (collectively "IDA/ICA") Complaint with prejudice. In their Complaint, IDA/ICA alleged
that portions of the County's newly enacted Confined Animal Feeding Operation ("CAFO")
ordinance regulating dairy and beef cattle farms in order to protect water quality are preempted
by state and federal laws and regulations. IDA/ICA also alleged that portions of the County's
ordinance violated the dormant commerce clause and the due process clauses of the federal and
state constitutions and sought an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
bringing the action. The District Court denied IDA/ICA's Motion for Summary Judgment and,
sua sponte, granted summary judgment to the County on the basis that the challenged portions of

the ordinance were a valid exercise of the County's siting powers under LLUPA and were not
impliedly preempted by state law.
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B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

•

On October 9, 2007, IDA/ICA filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive
Relief challenging the validity and constitutionality of the provisions of Gooding County CAFO
Ordinance No. 90 (the "Ordinance"). See R. Vol. I, pp. 1-38.

On November 30, 2007, the

parties filed a written Consent to File Amended Complaint and an Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief. See R. Vol. I, pp. 39-40 (Consent); R. Vol. I, pp.
41-56 (Amended Complaint).

The County filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint on

December 17, 2007. See R. Vol. I, pp. 57-67.
On July 18, 2008, IDA/ICA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. Vol. I,
pp. 68-70. IDA/ICA's Motion was supported by a Memorandum and the Affidavits of Anthony
Brand, Mathew Thompson, Gregory Ledbetter, D.V.M., Marv Patten and Debora K. Kristensen.
See R. Vol. I, pp.71-128, Vol. II, pp. 129-358, Vol. III, pp. 359-565, Vol. IV, pp. 566-794,

Vol. V, pp. 795-1010.

On August 15, 2008, the County filed a Brief in Opposition to

IDA/ICA's Motion for Summary Judgment (see R. Vol. VI, pp. 1011-1020) and the Affidavits of
John Horgan and Paul Kroeger in opposition to IDA/ICA's Motion. See R. Vol. VI, pp. 1021-

1148.

On August 16, 2008, the County filed an additional Affidavit of Tom Faulkner in

opposition to IDA/ICA's Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. Vol. VI, pp. 1149-1151.
On August 26, 2008, IDA/ICA filed their Reply to Defendant's Opposition to IDA/ICA's
Motion for Summary Judgment (see R. Vol. VI, pp. 1155-1172) together with a Second Affidavit
of Debora K. Kristensen in Support of IDA/ICA's Motion for Summary Judgment. See R.
Vol. VI, pp. 1154(a)-1154(dd).
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On September 2, 2008, the District Court held a hearing on IDA/ICA's Motion for
Summary Judgment. See Transcript on Appeal. On October 28, 2008, the District Court (Judge
R. Barry Wood) issued Orders on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's
Motion to Strike Affidavits, denying IDA/ICA's Motion for Summary Judgment and, sua sponte,
granting judgment in favor of the County. See R. Vol. VI, pp. 1173-1227. On November 6,
2008, the District Court entered Judgment on Summary Judgment. See R. Vol. VI, pp. 12281233.
On December I 0, 2008, IDA/ICA timely filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court. See R.
Vol. VI, pp. 1234-1238.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Regulatory Background.

Dairy and beef cattle operators in Idaho are required to comply with a comprehensive set
of federal and state environmental laws and regulations aimed at protecting water quality in their
daily operations, regardless of the county in which they are situated.

a.

Federal Regulation: Clean Water Act and NPDES Permit.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, commonly referred to as the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., was adopted by Congress "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a)(l). To do so, the CWA uses a two-tiered system: (1) water quality standards set by
states (see 33 U.S.C. § 1313); and (2) effluent limitations set by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") generally using technology controls that regulate the point source discharge of

-3-

pollutants to navigable waters of the United States through the National Pollutant Discharge
•

Elimination System ("NPDES"). See 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
In Idaho, the NPDES permit program is administered by the EPA.' Under the CWA,
however, states such as Idaho must certify that their NPDES-permitted projects comply with state
water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 ("§ 401 Certification"). In Idaho, NPDES permit
holders must comply with Idaho Water Quality Standards and Wastewater Treatment Standards
to obtain § 401 Certification. See IDAPA 58.01.02. The Idaho Department of Environmental
. Quality ("DEQ") is responsible for issuing § 401 Certifications to the EPA in Idaho.2
In regulating the discharge of pollutants under the CWA, the EPA requires "point source"

discharges to obtain a NPDES permit. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.l(b), 412. The CWA specifically
defines "point source" to include farms, dairies and CAFOs.
Agricultural waste is defined as a "pollutant" under the CWA.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 3
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).

"Navigable waters" is broadly defined to include all waters used in interstate or foreign
commerce and all intrastate lakes, rivers, streams, mudflats, wetlands or natural ponds, the
degradation of which could affect interstate commerce or recreation. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.

1

See R. Vol. II, p. 213.
See Surface Water:§ 401 Certification Process ("DEQ is responsible for issuing§ 401 certifications in Idaho")
available at http://www.deg.state.id.us/water/permits forrns/permitting/401 certification.din. See also I.C. § 224903(4) ("The director of the department of environmental quality shall consult with the director of the department
of agriculture before certifying discharges from beef cattle animal feeding operations as provided under 33 U.S.C.
section 1341").
3
The CWA defines a CAFO, inter alia, as an animal feeding operation ("AFO") that stables or confmes 200 or more
mature dairy cows, whether milked or dry and, if the facility has less than 700 such dairy cows, either discharges
pollutants into the waters of the United States through man-made devices or discharges pollutants directly into such
waters which originate outside of and pass over, across or through the facility or otherwise come into direct contact.
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b).
2
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.

Accordingly, CAFOs which may discharge agricultural waste into waters of the United States are
.

required to obtain a NPDES permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1).4

b.

State Regulation ofDairies in Idaho.

Idaho dairies are highly regulated. The Sanitary Inspection of Dairy Products Act, Idaho
Code § 37-401, et seq. ("Dairy Act") was enacted by the Idaho Legislature in 1943, establishing
the Idaho State Department of Agriculture ("ISDA'') as the agency with authority to inspect dairy
products. 1943 Idaho Laws Ch. 85 (H.B. 136). In 1996, the Dairy Act was amended to provide
the ISDA with the additional authority to approve and inspect dairy waste systems in order to
"carry out the intent of the Idaho Dairy Waste Initiative Memorandum of Understanding between
the Division of Environmental Quality, Environmental Protection Agency, Idaho Dairymen's
Association and the Department of Agriculture." 1996 Idaho Laws Ch. 81 (H.B. 635).'
The Dairy MOU "sets forth a working arrangement between the agencies and the Idaho
dairymen to reduce duplicative inspection efforts, increase the frequency of inspections of dairy
waste management systems and to provide a sound inspection program, in order to prevent
pollution and protect Idaho's surface and groundwater from dairy waste contamination." R. Vol.

4

On November 20, 2008, the EPA finalized complex rules for NPDES permits for mediwn and large CAFOs (e.g.,
200 or more cows). See Revised NPDES Permit Regulations and Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations in Response to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,417 (Nov. 20, 2008) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122 and 412). These rules became effective December 22, 2008. Id. Under these new
rules, Idaho CAFOs which discharge or "propose to discharge" into the waters of the United States must apply to be
part of the EPA general permit or receive an individual permit.
' See R. Vol. II, pp. 158-171 (copies of the Idaho Dairy Pollution Prevention Initiative Memorandwn of
Understanding ("Dairy MOU''), together with its subsequent renewals). EPA has recently notified ISDA that it will
not renew its participation in the Dairy MOU. Accordingly, the Dairy MOU will expire by its own terms effective
May 1, 2009, and EPA will continue to conduct its own CWA compliance inspections of dairies in Idaho.
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II, p. 158 (emphasis added).

To do so, the Dairy MOU transferred responsibility of dairy

supervision from DEQ to ISDA and, even though the EPA, and not the state, has NPDES permit
issuing authority in Idaho, the EPA agreed to delegate CWA compliance inspections to ISDA. R.
Vol. II, pp. 158-162. The Dairy MOU specifically designates ISDA as the agency that will
"approve the design, construction, and locating of dairy waste management systems for dairy
farms." R. Vol. II, p. 160. And, the Dairy MOU recognizes ISDA's important role in ensuring
that water quality is maintained at dairies in accordance with the provisions outlined in DEQ's

Idaho Waste Management Guidelines for Confined Feeding Operations ("Waste Guidelines").
R. Vol. II, p. 164 (2001 Dairy MOU at I), and R. Vol. II, pp. 195-284 (Waste Guidelines).6

In 2000, the Dairy Act was amended to require all dairy farms to have an ISDA-approved
Nutrient Management Plan ("NMP"). 7 LC. § 37-401(4).

Dairies that fail to comply with any

provision of the Dairy Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and/or face civil penalties.
LC. § 37-408.

c.

State Regulation ofBeef Cattle Operations in Idaho.

The Beef Cattle Environmental Control Act, Idaho Code § 22-4901 et seq. ("Beef Cattle
Act") was enacted in 2000 with the following Statement of Purpose:
The purpose of this bill is to consolidate existing state and federal
environmental requirements at the Idaho department of agriculture
in order to increase the speed, efficiency and manner in which
6

The Waste Guidelines are incorporated into ISDA's Rules Governing Dairy Waste. See IDAPA 02.04.14.004.08.
A NMP is a plan for "[m]anaging the amount, source, placement, form and timing of the application of nutrients
and soil amendments." See R. Vol. II, p. 181 (Natural Resources Conservation Service ("NRCS") Conservation
Practice Standard, Nutrient Management Code 590 ("NRCS Standard")). The NRCS Standard is utilized nationwide
and has been adopted by ISDA and incorporated into its Rules Governing Beef Cattle Animal Feeding Operations,
IDAPA 02.04.15.004.04, and its Rules Governing Dairy Waste, IDAPA 02.04.14.17.
7
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these requirements are administered and enforced.
While
increasing environmental compliance that is in the best interest of
the general public, this bill will also be in the best interest of
ranchers and feedlots across the state. The bill will simplify the
currently complicated requirements for existing beef operations in
a manner that is easy to understand and implement in a costeffective, practical manner. This bill clearly provides that the Idaho
state department of agriculture has authority within the confines of
the beef AFO but outside the confines of the beef AFO the
Division of Environmental Quality maintains authority for human
health and safety.
2000 Idaho Laws Ch. 63 (S.B. 1398) (emphasis added). Idaho Code Section 22-4902 further
describes the legislative intent for the Beef Cattle Act:
(l) The legislature recognizes the importance of protecting state
natural resources including, surface water and ground water. . . .
The beef cattle industry produces manure and process wastewater
which, when properly used, supplies valuable nutrients and organic
matter to soils and is protective of the environment, but may, when
improperly stored and managed, create adverse impacts on natural
resources, including waters of the state. This chapter is intended to
ensure that manure and process wastewater associated with beef
cattle operations are handled in a manner which protects the natural
resources of the state.
(2) Further, the legislature recognizes that the beef cattle industry is
potentially subject to various state and federal laws designed to
protect state natural resources and that the Idaho department of
agriculture is in the best position to administer and implement
these various laws . . . . The department shall have authority to
administer all laws to protect the quality of water within the
confines of a beef cattle animal feeding operation.
Idaho Code § 22-4902 (emphasis added).
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To meet its stated purpose, the Beef Cattle Act requires
ISDA approval of a NMP for
.
every beef cattle operation in the state of Idaho. LC. § 22-4906.' The ISDA is also responsible
for inspections and investigations concerning compliance with NMPs. LC. § 22-4902. The Beef
Cattle Act specifies civil penalties for failure to comply with its terms (see LC. § 22-4909), but
also creates statutory "safe harbors" for producers who comply with its terms. LC. § 22-4910.

d.

NMPs: Nutrient Management Plans.

In Idaho, all NMPs must be prepared by a Certified Nutrient Management Planner and
approved by the ISDA. See R. Vol. III, p. 360. NMPs are written to achieve crop production
goals while minimizing the environmental impact (e.g., water quality) of nutrients (nitrogen,
phosphorus and potassium) for a specific site.9 See R. Vol. III, p. 361. These plans are not "one
size fits all"; indeed, they are highly specific to the operation at issue in that they take into
consideration herd size, facility design, number of crop acres, soils, climate and crop productions
to:
I) Assure proper containment of animal manure and process waste
water.
2) Assess resource concerns which exist on the property.
3) Budget nutrient sources to optimize crop water and nutrient
needs. Nutrient sources include commercial fertilizers, animal
manure, mineralization of previous crop residues and irrigation
water.

8

ISDA also has authority to regulate animal waste management systems through approved NMPs for swine and
poultry facilities in Idaho. See IDAPA 58.01.09.
9
See R. Vol. II, p. 307 ("The purpose of a nutrient management plan is to meet agricultural production goals and to
certify that manure and nutrients are properly managed to minimize adverse impacts to surface or groundwater")
(emphasis added).
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4) Assess irrigation water management to minimize movement of
nutrients beyond the root zone or with runoff.

Id. See also R. Vol. II, p. 307. A key concern for animal waste management systems is the
concentration of certain nutrients in the soil due to crop fertilizers and livestock waste that may
affect water quality. See R. Vol. III, p. 361. 10

If a producer does not have enough acres to utilize nutrients produced from its dairy or
feedlot, the producer must obtain additional crop acreage or export the excess animal waste. See

R. Vol. III, p. 362. If the waste is exported, the NMP must document the export location and its
total acreage and owner. Id. There are no restrictions on where waste can be exported under a
NMP. See R. Vol. I, p. 121. Overall, the NMP provides a complex scientific and technologybased approach to managing animal waste at CAFOs in order to preserve and maintain water
quality. See R. Vol. III, p. 362.11
Once completed, a NMP is submitted to the ISDA for approval. See R. Vol. III, p. 362.
ISDA enforces all NMP plans through unannounced annual inspections. Id. See also IDAPA
02.04.15.051 12 and IDAPA 02.04.14.012.13 If a site is not in compliance with its NMP, it can
receive substantial fines. See R. Vol. II, p. 343. See also R. Vol. III, p. 363 and R. Vol. V,

10

See R. Vol. II, p. 183. The NRCS Standard sets forth the technical standards for preventing nutrient pollution,
including setting the Phosphorus Threshold ("TH") concentrations at 40 ppm for surface water runoff. See R.
Vol. III, pp. 361-362. Idaho has a TH standard that is more stringent than many of our neighboring states. See R.
Vol. III, p. 362.
11 For a sample NMP, see R. Vol. II, pp. 286-304.
12 See R. Vol. II, pp. 338-339 (copy of form used by ISDA to document livestock facility waste inspections). In
2006 and 2007, the ISDA conducted l, 174 statewide waste inspections of beef cattle facilities, and it conducted 20
inspections on the 29 beef facilities located in Gooding County. See R. Vol. III, pp. 362-363 and R. Vol. V, p. 999.
13 See R. Vol. II, pp. 341-355 (copy of form used by ISDA to document dairy farm facility waste inspections). In
2006 and 2007, the ISDA conducted a total of703 inspections on the 99 dairy producers in Gooding County. See R.
Vol. III, p. 362 and R. Vol. V, p. 999.
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pp. 1001-1004 (ISDA's dairy
penalty matrix); R. Vol. III, p. 363 and R. Vol. V, pp. 1006-1010
.
(ISDA's beef cattle penalty matrix).
D.

THE ORDINANCE

On or about June 12, 2007, the County, through its Board of County Commissioners,
adopted the Ordinance to regulate the operation of existing, expanded or enlarged, and newly
constructed CAFOs 14 in Gooding County, Idaho. See R. Vol. II, pp. 135-156. The Ordinance
was enacted to protect "the aquifers, watersheds, surface water, ground water, springs and water
courses located in Gooding County" from pollution caused "by the locating of CAFOs on or near
rivers, flood plains and canyon rims or in other areas where aquifers are subject to surface use
influences." See R. Vol. II, p. 140.

The Ordinance notes that,"... over application of animal

waste has increased potential to contaminate both agricultural soil and water resources" (R. Vol.
II, p. 139) and " ... there is insufficient irrigated tillable land available in Gooding County to
handle the animal waste produced by existing CAFOs." R. Vol. II, p. 139.
In order to meet its stated purpose, the Ordinance requires that a CAPO "follow and be in
compliance with a current nutrient management plan which has been approved by [ISDA]," (see

14

The Ordinance defmes a CAFO as: "An operation where the following conditions exist: a) Animals have been,
are, or will be stabled, confined, fed or maintained for six (6) months of any calendar year, and b) Crops, vegetation,
forage growth or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over at least a 25% portion of
any of the corral or other confinement area, and c) Any combination of animal units, which totaling [sic] 70 animal
units or more; or d) Any operation with a milk shipping permit; or e) Any operation with a liquid waste management
system." See R. Vol. II, p. 142. The Ordinance assigns dairy and beef cattle an "animal equivalency factor'' ("AEF")
primarily based on the weight of the animal. For instance, dairy "Bull/Holsteins 1,400 pounds" are assigned a 1.4
AEF, while "Bull/Heifers 100-299 pounds" are assigned a 0.2 AEF. See R. Vol. II, pp. 140-141. Beef"Steer/Cows
(over 1,000 lbs)" are assigned a l.O AEF. Id. "Animal Units" are then calculated by multiplying the number of
specific animals by their corresponding AEF. Id.
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R. Vol. II, p. 149), and be in compliance with applicable state and federal laws l_'elated to water
quality. See R. Vol. II, p. 150. The Ordinance also institutes certain setbacks for locating CAFO
waste management systems in the County (see R. Vol. II, p. 142) and prohibits a new CAFO
from being "located within one (I) mile of the rim of either the Snake River Canyon or the
Malad River Canyon," (see R. Vol. II, p. 151), and "within two thousand six hundred forty feet
(2,640) Zone 'A' flood plain as set out on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's 1985
Flood Insurance Rate Map for Gooding County." See R. Vol. II, p. 151. Finally, the Ordinance
prohibits CAFOs from having more than "five ( 5) animal units per tillable, irrigated acre owned
by the CAFO applicant. The land base to support the animal units is required to be in Gooding
County with the exception of contiguous land in an adjacent county." See R. Vol. II, p. 150. 15

II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the Ordinance, enacted pursuant to LLUP A, may regulate water quality

at CAFOs when water quality is comprehensively regulated by state and federal law?
B.

Whether the Ordinance's one-size-fits-all animal density cap of five (5) animal

units per "tillable, irrigated" acre is arbitrary and established without a rational basis, in violation
of the substantive due process protections of the state and federal constitutions?

15

CAFO owners may seek a variance under the Ordinance "to increase the animal density to a maximum of seven (7)
animal units per irrigated tillable acre," but no criteria for obtaining such a variance are included in the Ordinance.
See R. Vol. II, p. 152. Instead, the Ordinance generally provides that consideration for a variance will be given
where the applicant "employs multiple, proven, enviromuental technologies or methods to enbance or improve air,
soil and water quality ..." R. Vol. II, p. 152. The fact that an applicant has obtained a state-approved NMP which
allows for a greater animal density at a CAFO, however, does not entitle an applicant to a corresponding variance
under the Ordinance.

- 11 -

C.

Whether the Ordinance's requirements that its animal density cap can only be
•

calculated using land owned by the CAFO operator and located in, or contiguous to, Gooding
County are arbitrary and established without a rational basis, in violation of the substantive due
process protections of the state and federal constitutions?
D.

Whether the Ordinance's effective requirement that CAFO operators dispose of

all of their animal waste within Gooding County violates the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution?
E.

Whether IPAIICA, if successful herein, are entitled to an award of their attorneys'

fees and costs incurred in pursuing this action under LC. § 12-121, the private attorney general
doctrine and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1988?

III.

STANDARDOFREVIEW

On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the standard of review is the same
standard used by the district court in originally ruling on the summary judgment motion.

Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008).

Summary judgment is

appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). If the evidence reveals no disputed
issues of material fact, what remains is a question of law, over which the Court exercises free
review. Dorea Enter., Inc. v. City of Blacifoot, 144 Idaho 422, 424, 163 P.3d 211, 213 (2007).
Here, the issues of appeal concern only questions oflaw.
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

•

THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT AND THE STATE OF IDAHO HAS IMPLIEDLY PREEMPTED
THE REGULATION OF WATER QUALITY AT CAFOS IN IDAHO THEREBY RENDERING
PORTIONS OF THE ORDINANCE INVALID.

The federal government, through the implementation of CWA and NPDES program, and
the state of Idaho, through implementation of the Dairy Act and Beef Cattle Act, has impliedly
preempted the Ordinance to the extent it seeks to regulate water quality at CAFOs. The
Ordinance acknowledges the federal and state authority in this area: "The CAFO will be in
compliance with the Clean Water Act and any relevant federal or state authority implementing
the Clean Water Act in Idaho." R. Vol. II, p. 150. Similarly, the Ordinance acknowledges the
state's authority to manage water quality at CAFOs pursuant to state-approved NMPs: "[i]f
required by a State of Idaho agency having jurisdiction, a CAFO shall follow and be in
compliance with a current nutrient management plan which has been approved by said agency."
R. Vol. II, p. 149. Regardless of the fact that a CAFO operator is in compliance with federal
water quality requirements and/or the terms of a state-approved NMP, however, the Ordinance
flatly prohibits CAFOs from having more than "five ( 5) animal units per tillable irrigated acre
owned by the CAPO applicant" (R. Vol. II, p. 150) and from being in certain locations (e.g.,
within certain distance of the rim of the Snake River Canyon), all in the name of protecting water
quality in the county. Consequently, the Ordinance imposes potentially conflicting and more
stringent water quality requirements for CAFOs beyond that of state and federal law.

In so

doing, it renders state-approved NMPs meaningless and undermines the uniform statewide
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system of regulating animal waste management systems so as to mitigate their potentially
harmful environmental effects.
Idaho recognizes three (3) independent tests for determining whether state law impliedly
preempts a local government ordinance:
I)

where state laws intend to fully occupy or preempt a particular area;

2)

where state government has acted in such a pervasive manner to regulate a

particular area that it must be assumed that it intended to occupy the entire field; or
3)

the nature of the subject matter calls for a uniform regulatory scheme.

Envitosafe Serv. of Idaho v. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987).

Meeting one of the three tests is sufficient to preclude local government regulation. Id. at 690,
735 P.2d at 1001 ("Taken alone this clear legislative intent is more than sufficient to preempt the
field and preclude local government regulation of the subject matter."). Here, the federal and
state16 governments have preempted local government regulation of water quality at CAFOs
under all three (3) tests.

1.

State Law Preempts Portions of The Ordinance Because The Legislature
Intended To Fully Occupy The Field of Regulating Water Quality at CAFOs.

Under Envirosafe's first preemption test, a local regulation will be found to be impliedly
preempted, and therefore invalid, where state laws intend to fully occupy or preempt that same

16

The state of Idaho comprehensively regulates all environmental aspects of a CAFO operation, not just water
quality, For instance, the state regulates odors (I.C. § 25-3801 et seq. and IDAPA 02.04.16), ammonia emissions
(IDAPA 58.01.01.760-764), open burning (IDAPA 58.01.01.600-617) and fugitive dust (IDAPA 58.01.01.561)
from CAFOs. See R. Vol. II, pp. 357-358 (DEQ flowchart summarizing comprehensive state environmental laws
regulating dairy and beef cattle CAFOs in the state of Idaho).
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area. _Envirosafe, 112 Idaho at 689,; 735 P.2d at 1000.

For example, in Envirosafe, this court

held that the Hazardous Waste Management Act, I.C. § 39-4401 et seq. ("HWMA") impliedly
preempted local regulation of hazardous waste disposal because the HWMA contained language
indicative of legislative intent to occupy the field of hazardous waste disposal. Specifically, the
court found that the following portions of the HWMA "evince a strong legislative intent that
regulation of the field of hazardous waste disposal" be accomplished by a uniform statewide
scheme. Id.
•

"The legislature intends that the State of Idaho enact and carry out a hazardous waste
program that will enable the state to assume primacy over hazardous waste
control ... " Id. (emphasis added).

•

The Board of Health and Welfare "adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary
and feasible for the management of post generation handling, collection,
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes within the state."
Id. (emphasis added).

•

"The director . . . shall have the power and the duty . . . to provide for uniform state
regulations and for interstate agreements relating to hazardous waste management."
Id. (emphasis added).

The Court made such a finding despite the fact that the ''HWMA contains no express language
indicating intent to preempt local regulation." Envirosafe, 112 Idaho at 690, 735 P.2d at 1001

(emphasis added).
Other states similarly analyze legislative intent to determine whether state law preempts
local regulation. In Craig v. County of Chatham, for example, the North Carolina Supreme
Court found that state law preempted a county swine ordinance that imposed more stringent

requirements than the state's swine farm regulations for farm siting and animal waste
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management. Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 46,. 565 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2002). The
Craig court reached this conclusion by examining the state law's legislative intent. Although the

North Carolina law did not specifically preempt local regulation, it did provide that "it is the
intention of the State to promote a cooperative and coordinated approach to animal waste
management among the agencies of the State." Craig, 356 N.C. at 48, 565 S.E.2d at 178
(emphasis added). The Court found that "this unequivocal statement makes it clear that the
purpose for creating these statutes was to regulate animal waste management at the state level. If
each county were allowed to enact its own waste management guidelines, there could be no
statewide 'coordinated approach."' Craig, 356 N.C. at 48, 565 S.E.2d at 178 (emphasis added).
In addition, the North Carolina law sought to minimize "the regulatory burden" of waste

management for swine farms. Id. The Court found this goal "would not be attainable if counties
could impose additional burdens on swine farmers to comply with varying regulations." Id.
(emphasis added). Finally, the Court emphasized the legislature intended state regulation of
waste management because "the agencies designated to implement the Animal Waste
Management Systems statutes are exclusively state agencies."

Id. (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that state law preempted the county
ordinance.
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Like the regulations in Envirosafe and Craig, the Beef Cattle Act and Dairy Act express a

•

clear legislative intent to preempt the local regulation of water quality at CAFOs throughout the
state."
First, and perhaps most significantly, under the Beef Cattle Act, the Idaho Legislature
unequivocally declared that the "department [of agriculture] shall have authority to administer all
laws to protect the quality of water within the confines of a beef cattle animal feeding operation."
LC. § 22-4902 (emphasis added).

See also I.C. § 22-4902 (the Beef Cattle Act "is intended to

ensure that manure and process wastewater associated with beef cattle operations are handled in a
manner" to protect the state's natural resources). By using the phrase "all laws," the legislature
closed the door on any argument that local government could administer its own laws to protect
the quality of water within the confines of a beef cattle CAFO. In order to carry out this purpose,
and similar to the intent for a "cooperative and coordinated" approach to animal waste
management in Craig, the Beef Cattle Act requires the submission of a NMP to the director of
ISDA.

LC. § 22-4906. See also 2000 Idaho Laws Ch. 63 (S.B. 1398) ("[the] purpose of [the

Beef Cattle Act] is to consolidate existing state and federal enviromnental requirements at the
Idaho department of agriculture in order to increase the speed, efficiency and manner in which
these requirements are administered and enforced.

The [Beef Cattle Act] will simplify the

currently complicated requirements for existing beef operations in a manner that is easy to
understand and implement in a cost-effective, practical manner") (emphasis added).

17

See also R. Vol. II, pp. 158-171 (Dairy MOU) and pp. 173-179 (Beef Cattle MOU).
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Second, the Dairy Act also expresses a clear intent to preempt the local regulation of
'

water quality at CAFOs throughout the state. Similar to the Beef Cattle Act, the Dairy Act
requires the submission of a NMP to the director of ISDA to ensure that the state's uniform
system of animal waste management is followed. See l.C. § 37-401. If each of Idaho's 44
counties is permitted to enact ordinances altering the requirements of state-approved NMPs, this
would defeat the goal of standardizing and consolidating animal waste management regulations
related to protecting the natural resources of the state.

See e.g., Craig, 356 N.C. at 48,

565 S.E.22d at 178 ("If each county were allowed to enact its own waste management guidelines,

there could be no statewide 'coordinated approach"').
Furthermore, as in Envirosafe and Craig, animal waste management in Idaho is
exclusively regulated by state and not local agencies. ISDA is given the sole authority to enforce
all environmental regulations at CAFOs under both the Dairy Act and the Beef Cattle Act. See
e.g., LC. §§ 22-4902, 37-405. See also IDAPA 02.04.12.01 I ("The Department is authorized to

approve the design, construction, operation, and location of dairy waste systems"); 2000 Idaho
Laws Ch. 188 (S.B. 1437) (the purpose of the Dairy Act is "to require all dairy farms in the state
to develop nutrient management plans and submit the plans to the Department of Agriculture for
approval"). By vesting all authority for approving NMPs and regulating other aspects of waste
management in state agencies - particularly as it relates to protecting water quality in the state the Idaho Legislature demonstrated its intent to preempt local government water quality
regulation at CAFOs.
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2.

State Law Preempts Portions of The Ordinance Because The State Has
Comprehensively Regulated Water Quality at CAFOs And Has Provided No
Window For Local Government Regulation.

A local ordinance conflicts with state law not only where the legislature intended to
preempt the field, but also where the state law fully occupies the field in which local legislation
attempts to enter. See Envirosafe, 112 Idaho at 689, 735 P.2d at 1000 ("The doctrine of implied
preemption typically applies in instances where, despite the lack of specific language preempting
regulation by local governmental entities, the state has acted in the area in such a pervasive
manner that it must be assumed that it intended to occupy the entire field of regulation")
(emphasis added). In Envirosafe, this Court found such an intention because the HWMA is a
"comprehensive statutory scheme" where the legislature "acted in an all-encompassing fashion
towards regulating the field of hazardous waste disposal." Id.
Here, too, the state of Idaho has acted in an all-encompassing fashion to regulate water
quality in the state. At the heart of the state's regulation in this area is the NPDES permitting
system under the CWA. As previously described, Idaho must certify to EPA that its NPDESpermitted projects comply with state water quality standards (e.g., § 401 Certification). These
are the same standards (e.g., NRCS Standard) applied to NMPs by the ISDA and required by the
Dairy Act and Beef Cattle Act. See I. C. §§ 37-401, 22-4906. Clearly, the EPA would not have
granted § 401 Certification authority to the state and the state would not have adopted the NRCS
Standard if counties were free to disregard such standards and change NMPs at their whim (e.g.,
potentially have 44 different standards for NMPs).
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•

NMPs in Idaho are required to include detailed documentation to demonstrate that an
•
operator is minimizing the environmental impacts of raising livestock on his/her specific site
while improving the efficiency of the operation. See generally, R. Vol. III p. 359 - R. Vol. V,
p. 1010. ISDA is responsible for inspections and investigations concerning compliance with
NMP. See l.C. §§ 37-401, 22-4902. Because the ISDA has complete and sole authority to
approve an operator's NMP and review ongoing compliance with the NMP, state legislation
regulating water quality compliance is comprehensive - there is no need for further regulation of
water quality at CAFOs by local governments. Indeed, further regulation of water quality at
CAFOs by local government would, inherently, be inconsistent with the uniform statewide
regulation of this area. 18

a.

LLUPA 's Grant ofAuthority to Counties to Site a CAFO Does Not Defeat
the State's Implied Preemption ofRegulating Water Quality at CAFOs.

The County argues that even where the field of regulating water quality appears
comprehensive, the Court should reject IDA/ICA's argument that the state has preempted the
field because LLUPA permits local regulation.

While LLUPA clearly gives counties the

authority to site a CAPO, see l.C. § 67-6529(2) ("Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, a board of county commissioners shall enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the

18

For example, the Beef Cattle Act provides that a NMP is considered a Best Management Practice ("BMP") for a
CAFO and must be followed. l.C. §§ 22-4905 & 4906. A county provision that is contrary to a state-approved NMP
is, therefore, not a BMP under Idaho Law and, by defmition, would require a CAFO to violate the Beef Cattle Act.
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.

siting of large
confined animal feeding operations
and facilities"),'9 this power merely provides
.
.

counties with the planning and zoning authority to enact ordinances to "encourage consistent
appearance, protect property values and promote the best use of property." Olson v. Ada County,
105 Idaho 18, 21, 665 P.2d 717, 720 (1983).

Accordingly, a county may properly enact

ordinances to establish things such as "zone classifications with permitted and prohibited uses,
setback requirements, maximum lot coverage limitations, building height limitations, and lot
depth requirements." Olson, 105 Idaho at 21, 665 P.2d at 720.

But, the authority to site a

CAFO does not extend to regulating water quality at CAFOs.
Here, the Ordinance goes well beyond the traditional functions of planning and zoning
(e.g., establishing zone classifications) with respect to CAFOs. It specifically adopts regulations,

such as animal density caps and canyon rim and flood plain setbacks, designed to regulate water
quality at CAFOs 20

-

regardless of the animal waste management practices being utilized at a

CAFO and regardless of the terms of a state-approved NMP and/or NPDES permit. The only
authority relied on for this power is LC. § 67-6502(k)'s goal of avoiding undue water and air
pollution - areas specifically and comprehensively regulated by the federal and state government.
Clearly LLUPA's aspirational goal of"avoiding undue water and air pollution" is insufficient to

19

I.C. § 67-6529D provides that counties may require "an applicant for siting a CAFO to submit an odor
management plan as part of their application." This provision was enacted in recognition of the fact that counties do
not have the expertise or resources to conduct an environmental evaluation of appropriate sites for CAFOs. See I.C.
§ 67-6529B(3). The Odor Management Plan section of l.C. 67-6529D provides that "[t]his act does not preempt
local regulation of a CAFO," thereby clarifying that ISDA's assistance in this area (e.g., Odor Management) does not
preempt a county's authority to site a CAFO under LLUPA.
20
As recognized by the District Court, the County "through these provisions, is essentially protecting non-CAFO
landowners who may be downstream from the effects of animal waste getting in the water or otherwise subject to
other forms of pollution." See R. Vol. VI, p. 1185.
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overcome the clear and comprehensive intent of the legislature to regulate "all laws to protect the
quality of water" within the confines of a CAFO. I. C. § 22-4902 (emphasis added).
Perhaps even more importantly, LLUPA specifically prohibits a county from using its
siting power to over-regulate CAFOs.

Idaho Code § 67-6529(1) provides: "No power granted

hereby shall be construed to empower a board of county commissioners to enact any ordinance or
resolution which deprives any owner of full and complete use of agricultural land for production
of any agricultural production." While this section does not provide a "carte blanche exemption
from all county zoning ordinances," Olson, 105 Idaho at 21, 665 P.2d at 720, it does prohibit
local ordinances that "may be applied so stringently as to infringe on the legitimate use of
agricultural lands for agricultural production." Id. Clearly, the Ordinance violates this section,
inter alia, where a CAFO has a state-approved NMP that allows for a greater animal density than

provided in the Ordinance (e.g., "infringes on the legitimate use of agricultural lands for
agricultural production").
Recently, this Court affirmed that a county's duty to regulate land use under the LLUPA
does not grant them authority to regulate other areas comprehensively addressed by state law.
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah Co., 144 Idaho 806, 172 P .3d 1081 (2007). Here, the state of

Idaho has comprehensively regulated water quality at CAFOs, leaving no role for the counties in
this area.
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3.

State Law Preempts the Ordinance Because the Regulation of Water Quality
at Dairy and Beef Cattle Farms Calls for a Uniform State Regulatory
Scheme.

State law also preempts local regulation where "the nature of the subject matter regulated
calls for a uniform state regulatory scheme." Envirosafe, 112 Idaho at 689, 735 P.2d at 1000. In

Envirosafe, this court emphasized "that the very subject matter here involved, the field of
hazardous waste disposal, is fraught with such unique concerns and dangers to both the state and
the nation that its regulation demands a statewide, rather than local, approach." Id. at 691,
735 P.3d at 1002 (emphasis added).

See also Gora v. City of Ferndale, 210 Mich. App. 622,

628,533 N.W.2d 840,843 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (city ordinance purporting to regulate massage
parlors impliedly preempted by state statutory scheme given that the "nature of the subject matter
regulated (e.g, the practice of a chosen occupation) involves an important civil liberty and calls
for a uniform regulatory scheme"); Halpern v. Sullivan Co., 171 A.D.2d 157, 160-61,
574 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (N.Y.A.D.3 Dept., 1991) (county mobile home ordinance impliedly
preempted by state statute which, inter alia, mandates a uniform state regulation and enforcement
scheme); Twp. of Cascade v. Cascade Res. Recovery, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 580, 590, 325
N.W.2d 500, 504 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (local ordinance impliedly preempted by state statutory
scheme because "the safe management and disposal of hazardous wastes is clearly an area which
demands uniform, statewide treatment"); People v. Llewellyn, 401 Mich. 314,326,257 N.W.2d
902, 906 (1977) (local anti-obscenity ordinance impliedly preempted by state criminal obscenity
statutory scheme "because the nature of the regulated subject matter demands uniform, statewide
treatment").
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Given the fact that potentially harmful environmental
impacts of CAFOs do not stop at
.
county borders, it is clear that water quality at dairy and beef cattle operations is best regulated by
a comprehensive and uniform statewide approach that complies with federal environmental law
and not by a patchwork of inconsistent and varied local requirements in each of Idaho's 44
counties. That is precisely why the state has sole authority to regulate this area. The Beef Cattle
Act describes the legislature's intent concerning animal waste management:
The legislature recoguizes the importance of protecting state
natural resources including, surface water and ground water. . . .
The beef cattle industry produces manure and process wastewater
which, when properly used, supplies valuable nutrients and organic
matter to soils and is protective of the environment, but may, when
improperly stored and managed, create adverse impacts on natural
resources, including waters of the state. This chapter is intended to
ensure that manure and process wastewater associated with beef
cattle operations are handled in a manner which protects the natural
resources of the state.
Further, the legislature recognizes that the beef cattle industry is
potentially subject to various state and federal laws designed to
protect state natural resources and that the Idaho department of
agriculture is in the best position to administer and implement
these various laws . . . . The department shall have authority to
administer all laws to protect the quality of water within the
confines of a beef cattle animal feeding operation.
I. C. § 22-4902 (emphasis added). See also R. Vol. II, pp. 157-179.
The legislature clearly recognizes the need to protect the natural resources of the state and
to comply with complex federal law and, therefore, has designated state agencies to regulate
water quality at CAFOs. Moreover, counties do not have the expertise or resources to effectively
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•

manage a uniform, comprehensive regulatory scherne. 21 Because water quality at dairy and beef
cattle operations is a subject matter best regulated by the state, any additional local regulation of
water quality would undermine Idaho's current uniform regulations and should be stricken.
B.

THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES CAFO OWNERS' AND OPERATORS' SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS AND SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN.

The United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against government deprivation of an
individual's life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I;
Idaho Const. art. I § 13.

Since the due process rights secured by both constitutions are

"substantially the same," reliance on both state and federal precedent to analyze due process
rights is appropriate. Matter ofMcNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 188,804 P.2d 911,917 (Idaho Ct. App.
1990).
The United States Supreme Court has described the relationship between procedural and
substantive due process as follows:
[T]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government, whether the fault lies in a
denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the exercise of
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a
legitimate governmental objective.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998).

Substantive due process requires a rational basis for government action that deprives one
of life, liberty or property. "[T]he reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate that the

21

This fact is made clear by I.C. § 67-6529D(2)'s offer to provide counties with the state's technical expertise to
determine the suitability of a specific site proposed to be a CAFO. See I.C. § 67-6529B(2) ("The siting of confmed
animal feeding operations is a complex and technically difficult undertaking requiring assistance to counties and
other units of local govermnent as they exercise their land use planning authority").
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judiciary will characterize
it as 'arbitrary."' Pace v. Hymas, 11 l Idaho 581, 586, 726 P.2d 693,
.
698 (1986). It is a limit on both legislative and administrative action. However, the "criteria to
identify what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
government officer that is at issue." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. When a legislative enactment that
does not affect fundamental rights is challenged:
Substantive due process, as guaranteed by both the United States
and Idaho Constitutions, embodies the requirement that a statute
bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective.
McNeely, 804 P.2d at 918. To prevail upon a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must

show that the government action was arbitrary, capricious or without a rational basis. Pace,
726 P.2d at 698.
The Ordinance violates IDNICA's substantive due process rights, in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, by arbitrarily depriving them of recognized property interests. Specifically,
the Ordinance limits the number of animals that a CAFO owner or operator may keep per
"tillable. irrigated acre" ofland. R. Vol. II, p. 150 (emphasis added). It also provides that animal
waste may only be applied to land owned by CAFO owners and operators. Id.

And, the

Ordinance requires application of CAFO animal waste to land that is either in Gooding County or
contiguous to Gooding County in an adjacent county when calculating the animal density cap.
Id.

These provisions are not reasonably related to Gooding County's stated objectives for

enacting the Ordinance and are wholly arbitrary.
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1.

The Ordinance's Land Application Regulations Are Arbitrary and Were
Established Without a Rational Basis.

The County enacted the Ordinance to "promote and protect the health, safety, and the
general welfare of the public." R. Vol. II, p. 140. The specific danger to the public health, safety
and welfare the County intended to address is, "a danger of pollution to the aquifers, watersheds,
surface water, groundwater, springs and water courses located in Gooding County .... " R. Vol.
II, p. 140. The County noted that," ... over application of animal waste has increased potential
to contaminate both agricultural soil and water resources." R. Vol. II, p. 139. The County found
that, " ... there is insufficient irrigated tillable land available in Gooding County to handle the
animal waste produced by existing CAFOs." R. Vol. II, p. 139.
To combat these perceived problems, the County mandated that animal waste from
CAFOs could only be applied to land owned by CAFO operators located in or contiguous to
Gooding County by enacting the following provision:
The approved maximum density of animals shall not exceed five
(5) animal units per tillable, irrigated acre owned by the CAFO
applicant. The land base to support the animal units is required to
be in Gooding County with the exception of contiguous land in an
adjacent county. Aquaculture shall remain at ten (10) animal units
per acre.
R. Vol. II, p. 150 (emphasis added). These requirements are arbitrary and irrational for several
reasons.
First, this provision will exacerbate the risk of water resource contamination rather than
protect the public from such risks.

The Board specifically found that there is not enough

irrigated tillable land in Gooding County to handle the amount of animal waste being produced
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by existing CJ\FOs. R. Vol. II, p. 139. But, Section VII.D.1 of the Ordinance prohibits CAFO
operators from sending their animal waste out of Gooding County. And, the Ordinance decreases
the number of acres available for land application by requiring the application site to be owned
by CAFO operators and limited to "tillable, irrigated" land as compared to all the land owned by
the CAFO operator. The net result is fewer acres available to CAFO operators for application of
more animal waste than is appropriate for these fewer acres. 22
This provision does not bear a reasonable relationship to the Board's objective in
enacting the Ordinance. Keeping all animal waste generated by Gooding County CAFOs in the
County and mandating its direct land application to an insufficient number of acres is not a
rational method of preventing contamination of water resources. It is difficult to imagine any
legitimate interest, held by the County, served by such requirements.
Second, there is absolutely no basis for requiring CAFO operators to own the land used to
dispose of their animal waste. The state of Idaho - the governing authority on managing animal
waste at CAFOs - does not require CAFO operators to own all the land needed to properly
dispose of their animal waste, because such a requirement presumes that all CAFOs use land
application to dispose of their animal waste. Such a presumption is arbitrary at best - since
NMPs allow for other methods of waste management, such as digesting, composting and
exporting - and, at worst, is wholly irrational and intended to be a barrier to commerce.

22

This provision of the Ordinance is in direct conflict with ISDA's regulations, pursuant to its NMP process, of
allowing producers to export their animal waste off-site with no restrictions on the ultimate location (e.g., out of
county or out of state). See R. Vol. Ill, p. 362; R. Vol. JI, p. 121. Moreover, the Ordinance improperly assumes
that all Gooding County CAFO operators only laud apply their animal wastes and do not follow some other, more
efficient, method to manage their animal waste (e.g., anaerobic digests, compost, exporting, etc.).
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Without a reasonable relatio~ship between either its stated purpose, or any other
legitimate government interest and the arbitrary nature of the land ownership requirement, the
Ordinance violates the United States and Idaho Constitutions' substantive due process
requirements.

2.

The Ordinance's Animal Unit Density Cap Is Arbitrary and Is Established
Without a Rational Basis.

The Ordinance requires a Siting Permit to operate a new CAFO, increase the number of
animal units of an existing CAFO, enlarge or change the footprint of an existing CAFO or to
enlarge the capacity or change the location of an existing CAFO's waste management system.
R. Vol. II, p. 146. Under typical application procedures, a Siting Permit will not be approved for
an applicant with an animal density greater than five (5) animal units per tillable, irrigated acre.
The approved maximum density of all animals shall not exceed
five (5) animal units per tillable irrigated acre owned by the CAFO
applicant. The land base to support the animal units is required to
be in Gooding County with the exception of contiguous land in an
adjacent county. Aquaculture shall remain at ten (10) animal units
per acre.
R. Vol. II, p. 150. Failure to comply with permitted animal density limits may result in a civil

enforcement action by the county which could include fines of up to $100.00 per day per animal
unit over the limit. R. Vol. II, p. 155.
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Even though the Ordinance makes animal density a criterion for approval of a Siting
Permit, the Ordinance neither requires the County to determine an applicant's site-specific
animal density nor gives the County any standards for making such a determination. 23
To obtain a Siting Permit, both new and existing CAFOs must "provide a letter
confirming approval ofa Nutrient Management Plan ..." R. Vol. II, p. 150. An existing CAFO
must also show it is complying with its NMP to obtain a Siting Permit to expand its operations.
R. Vol. II, p. 150. Part of the NMP analysis is a determination of an appropriate animal density

for a given applicant's CAFO operation.
The Ordinance relies upon the data and analysis (e.g., accepts the state's conclusions) that
go into a NMP's animal density determination so long as that density is five (5) animal units per
acre or less. When a NMP determines that an appropriate animal density limit is greater than
five (5) animal units per acre, however, the Ordinance essentially ignores (i.e., rejects the state's
conclusions) the scientific analysis that goes into that determination. The Ordinance does not
state that the NMP analysis is any less reliable when animal densities of more than five (5)
animal units per acre are permitted, nor does it state the existence of increased risk of harm to
water resources when more than five (5) animal units per acre are allowed. There is nothing in

23

The Ordinance's Variance provision allows the County to determine whether a seven (7) animal unit per acre limit
is more appropriate than the usual five (5) animal units per acre limit. Consideration will be given to a request for a
variance where the applicant "employs multiple, proven, enviromnental technologies or methods to enhance or
improve air, soil, and water quality ...." R. Vol. II, p. 152.
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the Ordinance that suggests five (5) animal units per acre is a significant threshold, much Jess an
appropriate limit for all CAFOs in all situations. 24
Setting a one-size-fits-all animal density maximum is inherently arbitrary because it fails
to recognize the potential efficacy of CAFO operators utilizing waste management programs
other than direct land application of the animal waste, that all aspects of CAFO waste
management are addressed in the NMP that is thoroughly reviewed and approved by the state of
Idaho and, importantly, that water quality is comprehensively regulated by the federal and state
governments. See R. Vol. II, pp. 126-127; R. Vol. II, p. 121. Existing technology now makes it
possible to efficiently process animal waste in a much more effective manner than is
contemplated by the Ordinance (e.g., direct land application) such that a CAFO can lawfully and
effectively deal with all, or nearly all, of its waste without direct land application of any of the
waste. See R. Vol. II, p. 127. To that end, the Ordinance is also arbitrary in that it does not
consider the total acreage a CAFO operator owns and instead limits the inquiry to "tillable,
irrigated acre[s]." See R. Vol. II, p. 121.
The County has passed an ordinance that will deprive CAFO operators of their property
interests in that portion of their herds that represent animal densities greater than five (5) animal
units per acre. The County does not have a rational reason for its limit on animal density. This
24

Moreover, under the Beef Cattle Act, a producer who acts in compliance with his NMP is considered to be
following a BMP. LC. § 22-4906 ("An approved nutrient management plan shall be implemented and considered a
best management practice"). The Ordinance's requirement that Gooding County producers act in a manner different
from their approved NMPs (e.g., Jess than the approved number of animal units at a CAFO) requires Gooding
County producers to act in violation ofa BMP and subject to state enforcement action. See e.g., l.C. § 22-4910.
The Ordinance is, therefore, in direct conflict with state law.
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limit is an arbitrary deprivation that violates both the United
States and Idaho Constitutions'
.
substantive due process requirements. As such, these provisions of the Ordinance must be
invalidated.
C.

THE ORDINANCE'S REQUIREMENT THAT A CAFO'S ANIMAL WASTE BE DISPOSED OF
WITHIN THE COUNTY IS AN UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The Ordinance effectively prohibits CAFO owners from lawfully disposing of their
animal waste outside the county (and state of Idaho):
The approved maximum density of animals shall not exceed five
(5) animals per tillable, irrigated acre owned by the CAFO
applicant. The land base to support the animal units is required to
be in Gooding County with the exception of contiguous land in an
adjacent county.
R. Vol.

n, p. 150 (emphasis added).
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution grants Congress authority,

"[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes."

It is a well-settled principal that the commerce clause is not only a source of

authorization for congressional action but is also a limitation on the power of states and local
govermnents to regulate interstate commerce. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326,
99 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 (1979); United Haulers Assoc., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 1792-793 (2007). This limitation on state power is referred

to as the negative or dormant commerce clause.
The United States Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered analysis to determine if
local laws violate the dormant commerce clause. The first step in this analysis is to decide
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whether the local law facially discriminates against interstate commerce. If it does, the law is
deemed per se invalid unless the state can show, under strict scrutiny, that it has no other means
to advance a legitimate local interest. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N. Y., 511 U.S.
383, 390-92, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1682-683 (1994); Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 909 F.Supp. 853,
858 (D. Puerto Rico, 1995).

If the local law does not discriminate against interstate commerce, courts use the
balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., wherein the United States Supreme Court stated:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844,847 (1970) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, the Ordinance violates the dormant commerce clause because its effective
prohibition against CAFO owners lawfully disposing of their animal waster outside of the county
(and state of Idaho) is facially discriminatory and/or places an excessive burden on interstate
commerce.
1.

The Ordinance Facially Discriminates Against Interstate Commerce.

Local laws that "impose commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of
commerce by reason of its origin or destination out of state" discriminate against interstate
commerce. C&A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 390, see also Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336-37, City of
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Philadelphia v. New. Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624-27, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2535-537 (1978). "The central

rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is
local economic protectionism ... " On The Green Apartments, LLC v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d
1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing C&A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 390).
In Hughes, the owner of a commercial minnow business in Texas was arrested for
transporting a load of minnows, purchased from an Oklahoma minnow dealer, to Texas. An
Oklahoma statute provided that, "no person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the
state which were seined or procured within the waters of this state.... " Hughes, 441 U.S. at
323. 25 The defendant argued that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the commerce
clause. Id. Applying the analytical framework outlined above, the court held that the statute
facially discriminated against interstate commerce by "overtly block[ing] the flow of interstate
commerce at [the] State's borders." Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336-37 (first brackets added, second
brackets in original). Accordingly, the statute was declared unconstitutional.
Like the unconstitutional statute in Hughes, the Ordinance blocks the flow of interstate
commerce. CAFO operators are effectively prohibited under Section VII.D.l of the Ordinance
from disposing of CAFO animal waste on land outside of, but not contiguous to, Gooding
County. The only reason for this prohibition is that the animal waste originates from a CAFO

25

Long before the United States Supreme Court developed the rubric currently used to analyze whether statutes
violate the dormant commerce clause, the Supreme Court of the Territory ofldaho invalidated a similar statute when
it held that, "whenever, under the pretense of an exercise of its police power, the state enacts any statute which
operates to prevent the free exchange between the states of lawful articles of trade, it is void because in conflict with
[the Commerce Clause]." Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 634, 23 P. 115 (Idaho Terr. 1890).
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located in Gooding County. Accordingly, thi.s prohibition is facially discriminatory to interstate
commerce.
Courts have long held that discrimination against interstate commerce raises a virtually
per se rule of invalidity. C&A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 392; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at

624. Indeed, this rule is only overcome in a "narrow class of cases in which the municipality can
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest." C&A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added), see also Hughes, 441 U.S. at
336-37. When assessing a challenged statute's purpose or the local interest it serves, courts are
not bound by the purpose or interest claimed by the legislative body that enacted the law. Courts
will identify the purpose or interest by determining "the practical impact of the law." Hughes,
441 U.S. at 336.
In this case, the Ordinance fails both aspects of a strict scrutiny test.
First, the County claims the local interest advanced by the Ordinance is protection of the
County's water resources from contamination. R. Vol. II, p. 140. However, the Ordinance's
practical impact increases the chances of CAFO animal waste contaminating the County's water
resources.

Prohibiting CAFO operators from disposing of CAFO animal waste outside of

Gooding County means more waste must be kept in the County where it poses the greatest threat
to the County's water resources.

Surely this result cannot further the County's interest in

protecting against water pollution.
Second, eveu if the Ordinance advances a legitimate local interest, there are less
discriminatory alternatives to prevent CAFO animal waste from contaminating Gooding
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County's V'{ater resources.

Most notably is the enforcement of existing federal and state

eµvironmental regulations - including a CAFO's state-approved NMP and NPDES general
permit - to protect the water and natural resources of the state. These measures already take into
account the specific design and technologies used at CAFOs to determine how best to protect the
natural resources of the state, including the County's water resources, and they provide sufficient
inspection and penalty provisions to ensure compliance therewith.
Section VII.D.1 of the Ordinance fails the strict scrutiny test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court to identify the narrow class of cases where such facial discrimination
against interstate commerce will be tolerated and, therefore, should be held invalid.

2.

The Ordinance Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause Because of the
Excessive Burden it Places on Interstate Commerce.

In addition to being facially discriminatory, Section VII.D.I of the Ordinance artificially
manipulates the supply of animal waste26 in markets outside of Gooding County (and the state of
Idaho) by prohibiting the export of such materials generated in Gooding County. See R. Vol. I,
pp. 116-17; R. Vol. I, p. 121; R. Vol. I, p. 126. Out-of-county entities seeking a source of animal
waste to process into fertilizer are denied access to all Gooding County CAPO animal waste.
This artificially suppresses supply which in tum raises the cost of animal waste used for things
such as compost or to produce electricity through an anaerobic digester. Id.

26

Animal waste is a valuable, commercial product that is used in various ways in interstate commerce. See R. Vol. I,
pp. 116-17 (animal waste from Gooding County used for compost bought and sold in Oregon); R. Vol. I, pp. 125-26
(animal waste from Gooding County used in anaerobic digester to produce electricity and for compost bought and
sold throughout Idaho and neighboring states); R. Vol. I, p. 121 (animal waste from Gooding County used for
compost outside of Gooding County).
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Assuming, arguendo, this Court
. finds that the Ordinance is not facially discriminatory, it
must still analyze the Ordinance under the Pike balancing test, which evaluates the "extent of the
burden that will be tolerated" in relation to the local interest involved and "whether it [the local
interest] could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 397 U.S. at 142.
Preventing contamination of the County's water resources is the stated purpose for the
Ordinance.

R. Vol. II, p. 140. However, that purpose is not served by requiring that the

potentially contaminating substance (e.g., animal waste) be stockpiled in geographic proximity to
the water resources sought to be protected (e.g., in Gooding County). Since the Ordinance does
not protect the County's water resources, there are no local putative benefits to outweigh the
burdens on interstate commerce created by the Ordinance.
The Ordinance's burden on interstate commerce is magnified when alternative means for
protecting water resources are considered. As discussed above, the County has other means to
protect its water resources which do not burden interstate commerce. Most notable, federal and
state governments have already enacted a comprehensive set of laws to protect the water quality
of the state. Thus, ensuring a CAFO operator's compliance with existing state (NMPs) and
federal environmental laws better ensures that the County's water resources are and will be
protected from animal waste produced at CAFOs. 27

27

Accordingly, Section VII.DJ of the

The Ordinance's requirement that a Gooding County producer must dispose of all of bis animal waste within the
county is in direct conflict with state law and approved NMPs, which allow producers to lawfully export their waste
without restriction as to its final destination. See R. Vol. I, p. 121. ·
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Ordinance imposes excessive burdens on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce
clause and must be invalidated.
D.

IDA/ICA ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF THEIR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS INCURRED IN THIS ACTION.

IDA/ICA are entitled to an award of their costs in this action pursuant to Idaho
Code § 10-1210 ("[i]n any proceeding under this act [Declaratory Relief Act] the court may make
such award of costs as may seem equitable and just"). IDA/ICA have brought this action to
challenge the unlawful acts of the County - which action will benefit all the citizens of Gooding
County, not just IDA/ICA. 28
IDA/ICA are also entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in this
action pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 ("In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal
or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term 'party'
or 'parties' is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.''). This Court has held that:
the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (l) to serve as a deterrent to
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy
for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial
burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to
correct mistakes agencies should never had made.

28

In its order denying IDA/ICA's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court recognized the broad impact of
IDA/ICA's legal position, noting: "all counties in Idaho with CAFO ordinance similar to Ordinance #90 would be
nullified, not just Gooding County's." See R. Vol. VI, p. 1185.
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Bogner
v. State Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, State Tax Comm 'n, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d
.
1056, 1061 (1984). Here, the County adopted an Ordinance purporting to regulate an area oflaw
exclusively covered by state law and, in several ways, directly in conflict with state law.
IDA/ICA attempted to point these facts out to the County prior to the adoption of the Ordinance,
but their objections went unheeded, and the County enacted the unlawful Ordinance anyway.
Under these circumstances, it is "unfair and unjustified" that IDNICA be forced to bear the
financial burden of remedying the County's unlawful actions by bringing the instant action.
Alternatively, IDNICA are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in this action under the private attorney general doctrine.

Under the private

attorney general doctrine, a private party may be entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and costs
incurred when bringing certain cases of societal importance. Specifically,
[t]he private attorney general doctrine allows an award of attorneys
fees based on three factors: (I) the strength or societal importance
of the public policy indicated by the litigation; (2) the necessity for
private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on
the plaintiff; and (3) the number of people standing to benefit from
the decision.
Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 130 Idaho 609, 614, 944 P.2d 1372, 1377 (1997). See also Hellar v.
Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 577-78, 682 P.2d 524, 530-31 (1984).

In Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 (1984), individuals brought a
constitutional challenge to the state's legislative reapportionment plan. The plaintiffs prevailed
on their claims at trial and were awarded fees under the private attorney general doctrine. On
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court began its analysis of the issue noting, "[i]t is appropriate that
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the people of Idaho pay for the services rendered in thei_r behalf if there is a proper le&al basis for
their doing so." Hellar, 106 Idaho at 577,682 P.2d at 530. The court then discussed each of the
three (3) requirements for an award of fees under the private attorney general doctrine and cited
the trial court's conclusion that,
It would be hard to imagine a case which would be more
appropriate for an award of attorney's fees under the Private
Attorney General Theory than the instant case considering its
magnitude and the number of Idaho citizens affected thereby.
Id., 106 Idaho at 578, 682 P.2d at 531. In upholding the trial court's award of fees, this court

rejected defendants' contentions that the award was improper because it was not supported by a
contract or statute granting attorneys' fees (i.e., the "American rule"). Id., 106 Idaho at 578, 682
P .2d at 531. The court did, however, reduce the award of fees by the amount of "enhancement"
given by the trial court, finding that such "enhancement" was excessive and "IDNICA's attorney
will be adequately and properly compensated without the enhancement award." Id., 106 Idaho at
578, 682 P.2d at 532.
Here, the IDNICA have brought a challenge to the County's enactment of the Ordinance
in violation of Idaho Law. Such action is for the benefit of all of the County's citizens, not just
IDNICA's members. As such, it is similar to the societal interests recognized in Hellar v.
Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho at 578, 682 P.2d at 531. Moreover, private action was necessary because

the County's attorney was the person who approved the County's unlawful actions. And, given
the County's defense in this action, it is clear that the County (or state) would not, independently,
challenge the County's unlawful Interim Ordinance. Finally, the financial burden upon the
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IDNICA, both non-profit, professional organizations, has been substantial. IDNICA are funded
through annual fees of its members and fundraising efforts. Accordingly, each of the three (3)
elements required for an award of attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine is
satisfied, and the IDNICA should be awarded their reasonable fees incurred in pursuing this
action.
Finally, IDNICA are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to vindicate their due process rights. A plaintiff may
recover its attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if it is the "prevailing party'' in an action to
enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Hewitt v.

Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)). A plaintiff is the prevailing party if it has "succeed[ed] on
any significant issue in litigation which achieve[ d] some of the benefit ... sought in bringing
suit." Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156
(1997) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983)).
Despite the non-mandatory language in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 that "the court, in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs," the United
States Supreme Court has Jong emphasized that "the court's discretion to deny a fee award to a
prevailing plaintiff is narrow. Absent 'special circumstances' fees should be awarded." New

York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 68 (1980) (emphasis added). See also Aware
Woman Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, Fl., 629 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5 th Cir. 1980) (same);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 429 ("a prevailing party 'should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust'") (citing S.Rep.
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No. 94-1011, p. 4. (1976), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (1976), p. 5912). But,
neither the "good faith" of the defendant in enacting an offending piece of legislation (see Am.

Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 1986)), nor the means of the
plaintiff(see New York Gaslight Club, 447 U.S. at 69-71), nor the financial impact which would
fall on individual taxpayers who did not participate in the offending act (see Aware Woman

Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, Fl., 629 F.2d at 1148) are sufficient "special circumstances"
to deny an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Section 1988 is remedial and, therefore, should be "broadly interpreted." Runyon v. Fasi,
762 F.Supp. at 285. "The basis for allowing such broad interpretation is to facilitate private
enforcement and to allow the attorney to explore and develop every aspect of the case." Id.

(citing Williams v. City of Fairburn, Ga, 702 F.2d 973, 976 (I 1th Cir. 1983)). As the legislative
history of Section 1988 points out:
civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee
awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to
have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important
Congressional policies which these laws contain.

Aware Woman Clinic, Inc., 629 F.2d at 1150 (citing S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News (1976), pp. 5908, 5910). Here, an award of
IDA/ICA's reasonable attorneys' fees is appropriate given the effort they have gone to to ensure
the vindication of their constitutional rights.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For each of the foregoing reasons, IDA/ICA respectfully request that the Court reverse the
decision of the District Court and strike the challenged portions of the Ordinance and award
IDA/ICA their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action.
DATED this 22nd day of April 2009.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
Attorneys for Appellants
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